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Cultural revolutions have a way of sneaking up on us lawyers. The
militant young women's lib advocate, the mature woman trying to support
her family, and the aged matron keeping up with current events may each
approach the lawyer asking questions about topics never studied in law
school. The young woman wants to know if she must take her husband's
surname if she marries, The female breadwinner thinks she and 50 other
women in her department are paid less because they are women and wants
to know what she can do about it. The matron wonders what her lawyer
thinks of the equal rights amendment. These people are not ahead of
their times. The civil rights aspect of the sexual revolution has arrived
in the law books. The passage of both the Equal Rights Amendment'
and the Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act of 19122 in
March, 1972, should have removed any lingering doubts. A brief survey
of some types of legal problems and the main sources of legal remedies




Discrimination oi the basis of sex may be classified as either public
or prlWate; either source of treafitg one sex differently from the other may
lead to legal conflicts. Public discrimination includes actions of govern-
mental representatives and statutory and case law that treat persons differ-
ently on the basis of sex.3 A classic example of public discrimination (by
*Lecturer in Law, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law. Member
Ohio, Colorado, and Missouri bars; B.A., Ohio University 1954; J.D., Ohio State
University College of Law 1957.
1. HXJ. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. Rxc. S4612 (daily ed.
Mar. 22, 1972).
2. Act of Mar. 8, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, amending 42 U.S.C.
2000e (1970).
3. This survey article makes no attempt to exhaust all such laws, but rather
gives illustrative examples. For other analyses, see: L. KAwowriz, WOMEN AND THE
(377)
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case law) which has been largely corrected by statute is the doctrine that
prevented a married woman from contracting or from controlling property
and money in her own name at law. The Married Women's Property
Acts passed during the 1800's ended most of these limitations.4 However,
in many states residual limitations on the married woman's power remained.
For example, in California the husband is declared head of the house-
hold5 and is given the basic power to manage the community property,
and in Florida a woman could not operate her own business without
court approval.7 Missouri law does not limit a wife's power to contract;
however, it follows the common law view that a wife's domicile follows
that of her husband.8
In the domestic relations area, many states follow the dichotomy of
Missouri law which requires that a license to marry may not issue with-
out the consent of the parent to a woman under 18 years old or to a man
under 21 years old.9 Some advocates of women's rights assert that this
distinction implies that there is no suitable goal in life for which a young
woman should be urged to prepare herself other than marriage.' 0 Men
may find the same law discriminatory since they must wait three years
longer to marry without permission. The view that men and women do
not merit different treatment in this respect is reflected by provisions in
proposed Missouri legislation based on the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act that 18 be the age for both sexes to be able to marry without parental
consent." The limitation that alimony may only be paid to the ex-wife
is also a discrimination on the basis of sex that the proposed legislation
would change. 12 Placing the obligation to support children on the father,
even though the mother may be more capable of supporting them, clearly
discriminates against men.'3
A questionable area of law concerns the married woman's use of
her maiden surname rather than her husband's surname. Although the
LAw: THE UNFINISmm REvOLUTION 1-100 (1969) [hereinafter dted as KANowrrz];
Freeman, The Legal Basis of the Sexual Caste System, 5 VARY. L. Rrv. 203 (1971);
Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective,
46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 675 (1971); Williams, Discriminatory Aspects of State."Protec-
tive" Legislation, 17 N.Y.L.F. 503 (1971); Comment, "A Little Dearer than His
Horse": Legal Stereotypes and the Feminine Personality, 6 HAuv. Civ. RIGHTs-CIV.
LID. L. Rnv. 260 (1971).
4. KAiownz 40.
5. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 156 (West 1954).
6. Id. §§ 172, 172a. See KANowrrz 62-67 for a discussion of the California
situation.
7. KAowrrz 57.
8. Phelps v. Phelps, 241 Mo. App. 1202, 246 S.W.2d 838 (K.C. Ct. App.
1952); Hairs v. Hairs, 222 Mo. App. 941, 300 S.W. 540 (K.C. Ct. App. 1927).
9. § 451.090, RSMo 1969.10. KANowriz 11.
11. Mo. S. 409, 76th Gen. Ass'y, 2d Sess. § 451.203 (1972); Mo. H. 1382, 76
Gen. Ass'y, 2d Sess. § 451.203 (1972); UNIrORM MARRAE Arm DIVORcE AC § 203.
12. Mo. S. 409, 76th Gen. Ass'y, 2d Sess. § 451.308 (1972); Mo. H. 1382, 76th
Gen. Ass'y, 2d Sess. § 451.308 (1972); UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIvoRCE ACr § 308.
13. See §§ 452.220, 559.353, RSMo 1969.
['Vol. 37
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SEX DISCRIMINATION
statement has often been made that a married woman is legally required
to assume her husband's name,' 4 the decided cases may not bear this out.
A recent analysis15 concludes that there is only one reported case in which
the wife had never chosen to use her husband's name for any purpose,
and it held that this was permissible. In that case the court held that in
Ohio the custom was not compelled, and that it had never been legally
required in England.16 Missouri courts have not dealt with this precise
problem. Statutes provide for a change of name court proceeding, but do
not require that the proceeding be utilized.' 7 By implication, this legislation
might permit a husband whose wife has used his name to prevent her from
changing it either formally or informally by showing that the change
would prejudice him.' 8 The divorce statutes also require the court, upon
request of the wife being divorced, to change her name to her maiden
name or any previous husband's name. 19 However, nothing implies that
she must have changed her name at the time she originally married.
Married Women's Property Acts did not directly affect tort law. Dis-
crimination exists in states which allow a husband a cause of action for
loss of consortium, but deny a comparable action to the wife.20 The wife's
action is recognized in Missouri so long as it is joined with the husband's
own action against the tort-feasor. 2 '
Numerous kinds of statutory limits on employment opportunity exist
in the various states. Some states forbid women to be employed in jobs
requiring lifting of certain weights-some as light as 10 pounds.2 2 Most
states have had statutes limiting the number of hours women may work.2a
Until 1972 Missouri statute forbade employment of a woman mor than
14. KANowrrz 41-42; 65 C.J.S. Names § 3 (1966).
15. Carlson, Surnames of Married Women and Legitimate Children, 17
N.Y.L.F., 552 (1971). The author purports to distinguish the few decided cases on
the ground that none involved a woman who chose to retain her maiden name
for all purposes. Recently, in the case of Forbush v, Wallace, 841 F. Supp. 217(M.D. Ala. 1971), a federal district court decided that Alabama common law re-
quired a married woman to use her husband's surname. The Supreme Court
summarily affirmed the decision that such a requirement does not violate equal
protection of the laws. Forbush v. Wallace, 92 S. Ct. 1179 (1972).
16. Krupa v. Green, 114 Ohio App. 497, 177 N.E.2d 616 (1961). The, court
said:
It is only by custom, in English speaking countries, that a woman, upon
marriage, adopts the surname of her husband in place of the surname of
her father. The State of Ohio follows this custom but there exists no
law compelling it. Id. at 501, 177 N.E.2d at 619.
17. See §§ 527.270.290, RSMo 1969.
18. See KAxowrz 44.
19. See § 452.100, RSMo 1969.
20. See Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp., 399 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1066 (1969).
21. Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. En Banc 1963);
Mo. R. Cirv. P. 66.01 (c).
22. E.g., CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1251-52 (West 1971). See 2 CCH EiML. PRAC.
20,095 (1972) (chart of Female Protective Laws).
23. See CCH, supra note 22.
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9 hours a day or 51 hours a week. 24 Some states deny a woman oppor-
tunity to work for a period preceding or following childbirth by forbidding
employment during that time. Missouri law forbids employment during
three weeks preceding and following birth.2 5 Other limits upon opportunity
to work in Missouri include a statutory prohibition of women working
in and around mines except in a clerical capacity,2 6 and a prohibition of
women cleaning mill machinery or working between transversing parts
of moving machinery.27
Examples of rules of state instrumentalities that discriminate would
include public school policies which deny pregnant women the opportunity
to teach, or which limit enrollment in certain courses to only girls or
to only boys. Anti-nepotism policies such as that of the University of
Missouri28 may well operate to discriminate against women. The policy
that closely related individuals should not both be employed by the Uni-
versity ordinarily forecloses the wife from job opportunities. 29
In political affairs, the classic example of discrimination on the basis
of sex was the denial of the opportunity to vote to women. The nineteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution 0 remedied this after a long
24. § 290.040, RSMo 1969 (repealed 1972). The Attorney General had ruled
that this section was superseded by federal legislation to the extent it was ap-
plicable. 28 Mo. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. 231 (Nov. 11, 1971).
25. § 290.060, RSMo 1969.
26. Id. § 293.060.
27, Id, § 292.040.
28. The employment of any person who is related by blood or marriage
as closely as the second degree to any employee of the University is dis-
couraged, but where such a person is needed to perform University serv-
ices and appears to be the best qualified person ivailable, such a person
may be employed by the University, . . [exceptioft to permitting the
latter employment include] Prospective employee is related .. . to ad-
ministrative superior, . ,. prospective full-tine employee is related to a
full.time University employee in the department to which he will be
assigned if employed ....
University of Mo.-Columbia, Faculty Handbook 18 (Sept., 1971). This part
of the rule should be distinguished from ruleg reflecting the nepotism pro-
hibitions of the Missouri Constitution or statutes which are aimed at preventing
administrators from employing relatives. See Mo. CoNstr, art. VII, § 6; §§ 75.740,
163.101, 168.126, 182.050, .190, .291, RSMo 1969.
29. See Murray, Economic and Educational Inequality Based on Sex: AnOverview, 5 VAru. L. Rzv. 237 (1971). The board of the Columbia chapter of the
Civil Liberties Union, in a letter written to Chancellor Schooling (of the Uni-
versity of Missouri-Columbia campus) on December 2, 1971, stated:
Although anti-nepotism rules do not generally specifically forbid the em-
ployment of women, it is our contention that with the present social struc-
ture of families and their implied expectancies of male-female roles, the
present rule results in de facto discrimination against woman.
In April, 1971, the Council of the American Association of University Professors
adopted a statement urging discontinuation of anti-nepotism policies because
they discriminate against relatives on a basis not related to their academic com-
petence. The statement was endorsed by the Board of Directors of the Association
of American Colleges in June, 1971. Am. Ass'N U. PROF. BULL., Summer, 1971,
at 221.
30. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIX.
[Vol. 37
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struggle. Some states limit jury duty to men. 1 On the other hand, the
Missouri Constitution still provides that a woman must be excused from
juy duty if she requests exemption. 82 Peculiar provisions of Missouri
statutes are those which give cities over 5,000 population and St. Louis
the power to appoint women to the police force.33 If smaller cities do
not have such power women are clearly discriminated against.
A number of criminal statutes treat the sexes differently. A few states
have had statutes calling for a heavier punishment for the same criminal
act when performed by a woman.84 Those who ardently criticize sex dif-
ferentiation in law assert that there is no justification for making only
the female participant in the crime of prostitution a law violator,3 5 or
in limiting the crime of statutory rape only to men.3 6 Nearly all the
organized women's rights groups have attacked the criminal abortion laws
as discriminatorily infringing upon the right of women to the control of
their own bodies.3 7
B. Private Discrimination
Private discrimination, especially in relation to employment, is the
type of discrimination most likely to generate legal conflicts. The dimen-
sions of the economic issue of sex discrimination in employment are im-
mense. The work pattern of women in the United States has changed
significantly in recent years with the result that the influence of women
in the work force and the economy has grown steadily. Eighty-five percent
of single women in their late twenties work.3 8 Forty-one percent of married
women living with husbands were employed in 1970,39 up from only 16%
in 1940.40. Nearly 40% of the total work force in this country is made up
31. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. Amx. § 40.01 (1) (1961). This statute was held con-
stitutional in Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), but was amended in 1967 to
reqrie service unless exempion is requested. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.01 (1) (1957).
See aiso LA. CoDE Caim. PFoo. art. 402 (1966). The constitutionality of this Ldilisi-
ana, statute was challenged in State v. Alexander, 255 La. 941, 233 So. 2d 891(1970), but the constitutional issues were never reached. See Alexander v. Louisi-
ana, 40 U.S.L.W. 4365 (U.S. April 3, 1972).
32. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 22 (b). Cf. State v. Smith, 467 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1971),
which held systematic and purposeful exclusion of women from the venire to be
an infringement of the defefidant's tights.
33. §§ 71.200, .210, 84.265, RSMo 1969.
84, See, e.g., N.Y. CoRmc. LAw § 311 (McKinney 1968); Commonwealth v.
Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968) (statute allowing heavier penialty for
women held unconstitutional).
35. Dorsen & Ross, The Necessity of a Constitutional Amendment, 6 H V.
Cv. RIG'Sr-Civ. Lm. L Rv. 216 (1971).
86. KANowirz 18-25.
37. See K. MiLL-Tr, SaxuAL Pouncs 43-44 (1970); National Organization
for Women, Statement of Purpose (1966); National Women's Political Caucus,
Statement of Purpose (1971); Moore, Abortion and Public Policy: What Are The
Issues?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 411 (1971).
88. J. Kz ps, SEx IN THE MA rKrAcF: A'.aumcA Woz'm AT WokK 18(Johns Hopkins Policy Studies in Employment & Welfare No. 11, 1971).
89. U.S. DEP'T Or CoznmRCE, STATisTIcAL ABSTRAcTS O'F Tru UNrrEr STATES
218 (1971).
40. J. KREs, supra note 38, at 19.
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of women. 41 Many women allege that they are discriminated against with-
out justification in regard to all aspects of employment. The fact that only
1% of the engineers, 3% of the lawyers, and 7% of the physicians in this
country are women is attributed in part to discrimination against women
within these professions.42 Statistics comparing earnings of women against
those of men with comparable educational standing in comparable occupa-
tions reveal a wide earnings discrepancy: the overall median income of
women is only 59% that of men in similar occupations with similar edu-
cation.43 In selected occupations the discrepancy is even greater: physicians'
and dentists' office attendants, 53%; cashiers, 53%; musicians and music
teachers, 29%. Even in the occupations where large numbers of women
are hired, their median income is significantly less than that of men:
dietitians, 68%; librarians, 77%; elementary teachers, 85%; payroll and
time-keeping clerks, 73%; stenographers, 70%.44 Claims are legion that
women are not advanced in rank, not placed in administrative positions,
and not given the whole panoply of employment rewards that men with
similar abilities would receive. 4 5
In response to assertions that the discrepancy in wages and the hesi-
tancy to advance in rank is justified by the high rate of drop out from
employment by women,4 6 women claim that the differential is too great
to be explained by that factor. In addition, census figures reveal that
more women who enter the work force remain in it than previously. The
drop from employment during the peak child bearing years is not as great
as it once was, and the return to employment is increasingly higher.4 7
The movement toward more day care centers and for maternity leaves
is expected to decrease even more the temporary drop from the job market.
Perhaps the most crucial claim of women is that the fact that a larger
number of women do leave employment does not justify denying employ-
ment rewards to a particular woman on the assumption that she. will do
so. Many of these women want to know what their legal rights are, and
what they can do about alleged unjustified differential treatment.
41. WOMEN'S BuREAU, U.S. DEP'T or LABOR, WOMEN WORKERs TODAY 1
(1970).
42. Barnes, Women and Entrance to the Legal Profession, 23 J. -LEGA ED.
276 (1971); Glancy, Women in Law: The Dependable Ones, HARv. L. SCHOOL
BULL., June, 1970, at 23; Murray, Economic and Educational Inequality Based on
Sex. An Overview, 5 VALP. L. REv. 237, 245 (1971).
43. V. OpPNHmmImER, Tim FEMALE LABOR FORCE 100-01 (1970) (table).
44. Id.
45. See C. EpSrEIN, WoitN's PLACE: OP'rONs AND Limars IN PROFESSIONAL
CAREEs (U. of Calif Press: Berkeley, 1971); J. KREpS, supra note 38; L. ROBINSON,
THE STATUS OF AcADEmIC WomEN Review 5, (ERIC Clearing-House on Higher
Education April, 1971); Murphy, Sex Discrimination in Employment-Can We
Legislate a Solution?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 487 (1971).
46. Comment, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights'
Act of 1961, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1180 (1971).
47. J. KREs, supra note 38, at 4-7; U.S. BuREAu or LAB. STATISTICS MONTHmY
LAB. REv., June, 1970, at 11 (graph).
[VoL 37
6





In 1872 the United States Supreme Court began a long train of
decisions which upheld state legislation treating women differently from
men. Bradwell v. Illinois4s involved a woman who sought to be admitted
to the practice of law in Illinois. Illinois denied admission to the bar to
married women. Mrs. Bradwell asserted that her rights under the privileges
and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment were violated. The
Court upheld the state's dosing of the legal profession to women; its rea-
soning was so broad that the same result would surely have occurred even
if violation of the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amend-
ment had been charged. The court accepted the stereotyped concept of
woman as mother and homemaker, and asserted that government need not
provide for anyone who was an exception to this stereotype. Justice Brad-
ley, concurring, spelled it out:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the
divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity,
of interests and views which belong, or should belong, to the
family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting
a distinct and independent career from that of her husband....
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of
the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the
general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon excep-
tional cases. 49
The next serious challenge to a state's power to treat men and women
differently came in the famous case of Muller v. Oregon.59 The case was
an outgrowth of the social welfare movedment to protect workers against
"exploitations" by employers. After legislation limiting the hours that
an employer could require employees to work had been declared an uncon-
stitutional infringement on employers' rights, the reform movement suc-
ceeded in passing legislation limiting only the hours that women could
48. 88 U.S. (16 Wall.) 180 (1872). Mrs. Bradwell's interesting career as edi-
tor and publisher of the Chicago Legal News and the Illinois session laws, and her
eventual admission to the Illinois bar as an honorary member were detailed in
Myra Bradwell, Cm. LEGAL NEws, Feb. 1894, at 200-06, 286.
49. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 180-41 (1872) (concurring opin-
ion).
50. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
1972.]
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work. It was this legislation that was upheld in Muller v. Oregon as having
a "rational" or "reasonable" basis, and, therefore, not infringing the equal
protection rights of women. The fame of the case is because it heralded
nearly free regulation of economic matters by the states. So long as a
"rational" basis for the legislation could be shown, it would be valid.
In the economic sphere almost anything served as a rational basis. In
Muller itself, a stereotyped notion of woman supplied the justification:
The two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions to be
performed by each, in the amount of physical strength, in the
capacity for long-continued labor, particularly when done stand-
ing, the influence of vigorous health upon the future well-being
of the race, the self-reliance which enables one to assert full rights,
and in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence. This
difference justifies a difference in legislation and upholds that
which is designed to compensate for some of the burdens which
rest upon her.
[H]istory discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent
upon man. He established his control at the outset by superior
physical strength, and this control in various forms, with diminish-
ing intensity, has continued to the present. As minors, though not
to the same extent, she has been looked upon in the courts as
needing especial care that her rights may be preserved.... Though
limitations upon personal and contractual rights may be removed
by legislation, there is that in her disposition and habits of life
which will operate against a full assertion of those rights ...
Differentiated by these matters from the other sex, she is properly
placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her pro-
tection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary
for, men and could not be sustained. It is. impossible to close one's
eyes to the fact that she still looks to her brother and depends
upon him. Even though all restrictions on political, personal and
contractual rights were taken away, and she stood, so far as statutes
are concerned, upon an absolutely equal plane with him, it would
still be true that she is so constituted that she will rest upon and
look to him for protection .... 51
Constitutional challenges to the status of women were largely quiescent
during the roaring twenties, the depression years, and World War II.
Women were given the vote by amendment. During the depression women
probably suffered equally with men, and surely during the war they were
encouraged to work and serve the war effort equally with men. Perhaps
it was the experience of postwar employment discrimination, rapidly fol-
lowed by the civil rights movement, that caused some women to stir. The
year 1948 marked the beginning of a noticeable trend toward assertion
of equality and demand for legal protection in the courts. In that year
51. Id. at 421-22.
[Vol. 37
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the Supreme 'Court again upheld discrirninatwry legislation against a claim
of denial of equal protection as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment5 2
Michigan law forbade a woman to tend bar unless she was the wife or
daughter of the bar owner. In -ace of assertions that the real motivation
for this statute was to keep bartending safe from female competition, the
Court found a "rational" basis in the need to protect women from physical
dangers of bartending. The Court, with no real consideration of the equal
protection issue, stated:
Michigan could, beyond question, forbid all women from working
behind a bar. This is so despite the vast changes in the social and
legal position of -women. The fact that women may now have
achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as their preroga-
tives and now indulge in vices that men have long practiced, does
not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between the
sexes.... Thne Constitution does not require legislatures to reflect
sociological igsight, or shifting social standards, any more than
it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific stand-
ards ....
Since the line they have drawn is not without a basis in rea-
son, we cannot give ear to the suggestion that the real impulse
behind this legislation was an unchivalrous desire of male bar-
tenders to try to monopolize the calling. 5
Although three jutjes dissented, this decision, 40 years after Muller v.
Oregon, applying the rational basis test in such a cavalier fashion, fore-
dosed the constitutional route as a viable means of attacking economic
discrimination by a state.
The next attack was on the political front. It came in 1961 in Hoyt
v. Ftorida,54 a case which challenged -as a denial of equal protection a
Florida statute that freed women from jury duty unless they specifically
requested to be put on the jury list, but which put men on the list with-
out request. The court upheld the statute. The test? Rational basis. The
evidence? The stereotyped notion that a woman's place is in the home,
and an unstated assumption that jury duty would interfere with this role
more than with the male breadwinner's role. The Court stated:
In neither respgct cn we cq nclude that Florida's statute is not
"based on some reasonable laJssification ... " Despite the en-
lightened emancipation of women from restrictions and protections
of bygone years, a~d their entry into many parts of community
life fopmerly co sidered to be reserved to men, woman is still re-
garded as the center of home and family life. 5
In January, 1969, the Supreme Court refused to act against discrimi-
52. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
53. Id. at 465-66.
54. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
55. Id. at 61-62.
1972]'
9
Krauskopf: Krauskopf: Sex Discrimination
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
MISSOURI LAW REFIEW
nation claimed to be 'violating rights to equal protection when it denied
certiorari in Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp.56 The circuit court had
held that it was permissible for a state which recognized an action in
the husband for loss of consortium to deny a comparable action to the
wife. In spite of arguments that double recovery could be avoided by
requiring joinder, as is done in Missouri, the court held that fear of
possible double recovery was justification enough for the differential treat-
ment. The court stated that courts would not set aside a discriminatory
rule as violating equal protection "if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it. ' ' 57
A little noted but significant decision of the Supreme Court was its
March, 1971 per curiam affirmance, without opinion, of the decision in
Williams v. McNair.58 The lower court had applied a rational basis test
to uphold denial of admission of men to a state college for women. The
court held that segregation by sex in certain state colleges did not violate
equal protection of the laws so long as there was a rational basis for the
discrimination. The court justified its finding of a rational basis with this
language:
[T]he Constitution does not require that a cassification "keep
abreast of the latest" in educational opinion, especially when there
remains a respectable opinion to the contrary; it only demands that
the discrimination not be wholly wanting in reason....
It is conceded that recognized pedagogical opinion is-divided on
the wisdom of maintaining "single-sex" institutions of higher
education but it is stipulated that there is a respectable body of
educators who believe that "a single sex institution can advance
the quality and effectiveness of its instruction by concentrating
upon areas of primary interest to-only one sex."59
For those who hoped that the Court would begin to treat sex discrimination
as it had racial discrimination by placing upon the states a heavy burden
of justification for differential treatment of the two sexes, 60 this affirmance
should have ceased their daydreaming. That schools, the battleground
against racial discrimination, can justifiably segregate to better concentrate
(in the opinion of a respectable body of educators) upon areas of primary
interest to only one sex, portends that no sexual discrimination by a state
which is justifiable in the opinion of a respectable portion of knowledgeable
people will violate the equal protection clause.
In light of this long history of not holding any state sex discriminatory
legislation invalid, Reed v. Reed,61 decided November 22, 1971, seems a
56. 599 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 598 U.S. 1066 (1969).
57. Id. at 850.
58. 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), affd per curiam, 89 U.S.L.W. 3888
(U.S. Mar. 7, 1971).
59. Id. at 137.
60. KAowrrZ 158.
61. 92 S. Ct. 251 (1971).
[Vol. 37
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landxhbxk decisi6n.' The" Supreme C6urt for the first time held that a
state statute treating women differently from men was unconstitutional
as a violation of equal protection. The Idaho statute which was declared
invalid provided that if a man and woman were equally qualified to
administer the estate of a deceased person, then the man was to be pre-
ferred. Though the opinion is sketchy, two aspects are dear. First, the
Court continued to apply the rational basis test, and reiterated that states
may treat different classes of persons differently if there is a reasonable
basis for the classification. Second, the Court did not utilize the stereo-
typed notion that a woman's place is in the home to supply the needed
rational basis. The Court found the different treatment arbitrary. If
the Court had followed the approach in Hoyt v. Florida,62 decided 10
years previously, it may well have assumed that administering estates would
detract in a socially unacceptable manner from a woman's role as the
center of family life. The significance of the case lies in the possibility
it reveals that the Court in the future will actually require evidence (even
if only the opinion of a respectable body of persons), rather than finding
a rational basis for sex discrimination in the canards and shibboleths,
concepts and stereotypes that are being questioned in today's culture. The
decision seems to belie the notion that the party attacking the legislation
has the burden of showing no rational basis.63 Perhaps the crux of the
Court's holding: that the distinction was arbitrary is that in matters of
sex differentiation the state will have to present some evidence to over-
come the attacking party's bald assertion that there is no discernible
difference between men and women in relation to the object of the legis-
lation.64
This discussion has concentrated on the United States Constitution
as interpr~eted by the Supreme Court, because it is the ultimate forum for
asserting unconstitutionality of state action. The practitioner would do
well, however, to consider what the possibilities are for redress in the lower
federal courts or in his own state courts. For example, the Supreme Court
of California, in striking down legislation denying women the right to
tend bar, held such legislation to be a denial of equal protection under
both the California and United States Constitutions.6 5 The court required
a substantial showing of justification rather than the rational basis test
of the United States Supreme Court. An outstanding example of a lower
federal decision which declared a discriminatory practice to be a violation
62. 868 U.S. 57 (1961).
63. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1968).
64. See Stanley v. Illinois, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972); In re Mark T., 8 Mich.
App. 122, 154 N.W.2d 27 (1967). Apparently the only argument raised in Reed
was the state's attempt to justify the classification as an expedient means of de-
cision-making by the probate judge. See the discussion in 92 S. Ct. at 254. Ex-
pediency as justification was rejected in Stanley v. Illinois, supra.
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of equal protection is Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Ihic,0s The
court climbed the hurdle of state action by holding that state action was
involved in the granting of a license to dispense beer, and in regulation
of the holders of this type of license. The court then held that the defendant-
bar did not have a basis in reason for its refusal to serve women.
B. Equal Rights Amendment
What is the relationship between these constitutional decisions and
the Equal Rights Amendment which is now before the states forratifica-
tion?- The version finally passed by Congress on March 22, 1972 is worded:
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any state on account of sex.67
For 50 years various women's groups sponsored legislation leading toward
the passage of an amendment to the United States Constitution which would
guarantee equal treatment of the sexes by the federal and state govern-
ments.68 The failure to achieve protection under the fourteenth amend-
ment has been a major impetus in this move; as Representative Griffiths
of Michigan succintly asserted: "This fight is with the Supreme Court."61
There is widespread belief among the members of women's groups that
this amendment will automatically end discrimination. Many persons with
whom this writer has conversed are not evea aware that it will affect
only governmental and not private action. Many believe that it will auto-
matically invalidate nearly all laws treating men and women differentlyTQ
they cite the voting rights amendment as precedent. On the other hand,
many also believe that in some respects government may still differentiate,
e.g., separate restrooms for men and women in public buildings.7 ' A tbroad
restriction upon sex discrimipation whic doe allow for some degree of
discrimination is in another league from the narrow voting rights amend-
ment. This writer is in agreement with those apitho ties who assert that
66. $17 F. Supp. W (S.D,N.Y. 1970).
67. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., gd Sess., 118 CoNG. REc. S4612 (d'Iy ed.
Mar. 22, 1972).
08. CrITZEN'4 ADvlsoIry Coturm, on irm STAtw Oi WoxzN, Woam, ru 1970,
at 9 (March, 1971) [hereinafter Cjted as WOMEN I 19701.69. Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 and S.J. Res. 231 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 228 (1970).
70. Sen. Ervin fought a last ditch effox to t a seies of qualifying amend-
ments on the resolution because he feared that its reach is so extensive that it
would bring chaos to the legal and social fabric of America. See 118 CoNG. REc.
4250 (daly .d. March 2, 1972) (remarks of Sen. Ervin). The lengthy debate
and defeat of the several Ervin amendments will be a rich source of legislative
history both during the ratification process and for interpretation if ratification
is eventually achieved. For highlights of the debate, see Equal Rights: Amendment
Passed Over Ervin Opposition, 80 CONG. Q. WEEiKt REP. 692-95 (Mar. 25, 1972).
The last debate and materials incorporated therein are in 118 CONG. REG. 4247-73,
4372-430, 4538-612 (daily editions Mar. 20, 21, 29 1972).
71. Senator Bayh, floor manager of the resolution, informed the Senate
that the right of privacy would insure reasonable segregation of this type. 118
CONG. REC. 4544 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
An intriguing ambiguity is revealed by the Citizens' Advisory Council on the
[Vol. 37
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the ambiguity of an equal rights amendment is such that only a series
of litigation will make its meaning and applicability clear; questions of
application and of justification for discrimination will have to be tested
out case by case.7 2 For that reason, some feel the amendment is an exercise
in futility; others, nevertheless, justify the attempt to pass it for its educa-
tional value, i.e., the process and the passage would influence cultural
notions about the role of men and women.73
There seems little doubt that the amendment would, at least, place
a substantial burden on the state to justify treating men and women
differently. At a minimum, it will create a presumption that discriminatory
legislation or action is invalid; in other words, sex discrimination would
be treated much the same as racial discrimination. Ratification of the
amendment will produce this change immediately. A source of difficulty
in interpretation will be the extent to which the words "equality of rights"
differ from "equal protection of the laws." The words chosen apparently
allow for less differential than would have been permissible with equal
protection words.74 Whatever the resolution of that ambiguity, the validity
of many state laws will obviously be put into question by the amendment.
Two of the specific matters debated on the floor of Congress were
the military draft and protective labor legislation. Amendments to exclude
Status of Women in its report. The council said that separation of the sexes
by law would be forbidden
except in situations where the separation is shown to be necessary because
of an overriding and compelling public interest and does not deny indi-
vidual rights and liberties. For example, in our present culture the rec-
ognition of the right to privacy would justify separate restroom facilities
in public buildings. WOMEN IN 1970, at 16.
Yet, at page 19, in its rejection of limiting words upon the amendment, the Coun-
cil emphatically said: "Women should not be singled out for special treatment in
the law under any constitutional test whether it be the test of 'reasonableness' or
a 'compelling and overriding public interest'."
72. Freund, The Equal Rights' Amendment is Not the Way, 6 HARV. Civ.
RlGrrrs-Crv. LIB. L. REV. 233 (1971).
78. Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 and S.]. Res. 231, supra note 69, at 164.
74. The Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of Women rejected "equal
protection" words as negating a guarantee of complete equality and allowing an
unwarranted test of "reasonableness" or "compelling" public interest to justify
special treatment of women. WOMEN IN 1970, at 19. Because of this choice of words,
Prof. Freund said: "[A] doctrinaire equality, then. is apparently the theme of the
amendment." Freund, supra note 72, at 238. To substantiate his fear that the
amendment would allow for no differential treatment, Sen. Ervin referred to
Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights' Amendment: A Constitu-
tional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971). However, the
analysis therein is that no differentiation on the basis of sex would be permissible
except that required by a constitutional right of privacy. Somewhat farther on
the spectrum is Prof. Kurland, who envisages that reasonable differential treat-
ment could be acceptable. Statement of Philip Kurland before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 118 CONG. REc. 4569, 4570 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1972). Senator Bayh in-
dicated in the final debate that he believed distinctions based on distinct male-
female physical differences would be permissible. In this regard, he stated that
"protective" labor legislation and obligations such as the duty to support children
would be made applicable to both sexes, but that criminal sanctions such as
1972]
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both of those from the amendment's operation were defeated;75 therefore,
it is expected that a draft law and labor legislation pertaining to only
men would be unconstitutional. Among the protective laws in Missouri
that are likely to be invalid unless applied equally to men are those limit-
ing the hours a day and week a woman may work,76 limiting the time before
and after childbirth a woman may work,77 forbidding women to work
around mines except in a clerical capacity, 78 forbidding women to clean
or work around moving machinery79 and even those requiring a place to
sit and screened stairways only where women work.8 0
In the area of family law many legal principles are likely to be affected
by the amendment, mostly in the direction of ending discrimination against
men. Differentials in ages for ability to marry without parental consent
are likely to be invalid.8l The result would be the end of discrimination
against the male, who now has to have permission until he is 21, and the
end of possible discrimination against the female, because of the protection
of only males from an unwise early marriage. The rule that a woman's
domicile follows that of her husband,8 2 and an attempt to apply a require-
ment that a woman use her husband's surname would be presumptively
invalid.8 3 Other legal doctrines likely to be changed would be to the benefit
of men: a limitation of the right of support from a spouse, whether during
or after marriage, to women only;8 4 the right of children to be supported
by the father rather than the mother;88 the mother favored for the right
to custody of very young children;80 and the right of only the mother of
an illegitimate child to consent to its adoption.8 7
In the political area the exemption from jury duty automatically
those of the White Slavery Act (forbidding transportation of women for immoral
purposes or prostitution) would remain because the latter are based on unique
physical differences. Equal Rights: Amendment Passed Over Ervin Opposition,
supra note 70, at 695. This writer fails to see the substantive distinctions the Sena-
tor so glibly draws.
75. Equal Rights: Amendment Passed Over Ervin Opposition, supra note 70,
at 694-95.
76. § 290.040, RSMo 1969 (repealed 1972).
77. Id. § 290.060.
78. Id. § 293.060.
79. Id. § 292.040.
80. Id. §§ 292.150, 170. Even if all of these statutes were superseded by
federal legislation, without the amendment they would remain effective in aspects
to which the federal law was not applicable. See text accompanying note 169 infra.
81. See, e.g., § '51.090 (2), RSMo 1969.
82. Cases cited note 8 supra.
83. For a discussion of this problem, see the text accompanying notes 14-19
supra.
84. See §§ 452.070, 559.353, RSMo 1969.
85. See id. §§ '52.220, 559.353.
86. See Horst v. McLain, 466 S.W.2d 187 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971).
87. See § 453.040, RSMo 1969. For an argument that a known father now
may have rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, see
Krauskopf, Missouri Adoption Law and the Proposed Uniform Adoption Act, 26
J. Mo. B. 172, 174 (1970). This argument is significantly advanced by the decision
in Stanley v. Illinois, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972).
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given to women by the Missouri Constitution is likely to be superseded
by the amendment.8 8 Again, it may be men who assert that a valuable right
(exemption) is granted to women on terms more favorable than those
accorded to men. The Missouri Public Accommodations Law does not
forbid discrimination on the basis of sex,80 and the amendment may
require reading that prohibition into the statute.
There are numerous practices of state agencies which may become
suspect under the amendment. Public schools probably could not limit
opportunities to take certain courses, such as cooking or automotive
mechanics, to members of one sex, and public schools and colleges probably
could not limit or forbid girls from attempting to participate in inter-
scholastic athletics. The controversy over long hair may continue or erupt
anew under this amendment. The circuits have split on the extent to
which they permit public shools to regulate the length of a male's hair,
and the Supreme Court continues to deny certiorari.9 0 Perhaps, a man
will have a "right" under the amendment to wear his hair as long as
women are permitted to wear theirs.
The examples could continue.0 ' The inescapable conclusion is that
the Equal Rights Amendment, if ratified, will provide much fuel for
litigation by both men and women, unless governmental agencies volun-
tarily cease treating men and women differently, solely on the basis of
their sex.
III. REMED S: EQUAL PAY LEGISLATION
Following World War II organized women's groups pushed for equal
pay legislation in every session of Congress. 2 In 1963, the Equal Pay Act
was finally passed as an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act.93
The key provision of the act states:
No employer having employees subject to any provision of this
section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such
employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex
by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less
88. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 22 (b).
89. Ch. 314, RSMo 1969.
90. See Christian, Students' Right to Choice of Personal Appearance in the
Public Schools, 36 Mo. L. REv. 529 (1971).
91. See generally S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Hearings on
S.J. Res. 61 and S.J. Res. 231, supra note 69; CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
THE STATUS OF WOMEN, MEMORANDUM ON THE EQUAL RIGHTS' AMENDMENT (March,
1970); WOMEN IN 1970, at 14-22; BROWN, et al., supra note 74; Dorsen & Ross, The
Necessity of a Constitutional Amendment, 6 HARV. Clv. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV.
216 (1971); Eastwood, The Double Standard of Justice: Women's Rights Under
the Constitution, 5 VALP. L. REV. 280, 298-317 (1971); Freund, supra note 72;
Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective,
46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 675 (1971); Equal Rights Amendment Passed Over Ervin Op-
position, supra note 70, at 693-95.
92. Berger, Equal Pay, Equal Employment Opportunity and Equal Enforce-
ment of the Law for Women, 5 VALP. L. REV. 326, 330 (1971).
93. Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d) (1970).
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than a rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite
sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance
of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which
are performed under similar working conditions except where such
payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other
factor other than sex.94
Although the Equal Pay Act is narrow in that it applies-only to wage
differentials, the enforcement provisions of the Act are strong. The em-
ployee or employees involved may sue directly for unpaid wages, an addi-
tional equal amount as liquidated damages, and reasonable attorney's fees.95
More importantly, the Secretary of Labor is authorized- to. sue for an
injunction and back wages.06 In one such action, 230 employees recovered
a quarter of a million dollars in damages.97 Since the Act applies to every
employer having employees subject to a minimum wage under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, the Wage and Hour Division of the Department
of Labor is the entity which administers it.
There has been a great deal of litigation under the Equal Pay Act,
often concerning what constitutes equal work. The plaintiff must show
that he or she performs work which calls for skill, responsibility, and
elfort equal to that required of the counterpart alleged to be receiving
a higher compensation. A significant case on this issue was decided by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1970. In Shultz v. American Can Co.,98
"equal" was held to mean "substantially equal," rather than identical.
The court refused to accept the contention that a higher rate of pay for
male machine operators was justified by additional duties of paper handling
and loading. The paper handling duties were regularly carried out by
lower paid workers, and the court found that the loading duties which
were occasionally carried out, even if regularly performed by men machine
operators, were "minor and incidental" to the main performance, and,
thus, were not justification for the higher wage rate. The case illustrates that
the courts will treat as specious claims that slight, incidental duties, espe-
cially of a type ordinarily paid at a lower rate, do not justify paying men
more than women.09
In 1963, the Missouri General Assembly passed an act which is some-
what similar to the federal statute in forbidding lower wages for women.100
94. Id., 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d) (1).
95. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b) (1970); Berger, supra note
92, at 349.
96. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216 (c), 217 (1970).
97. Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
905 (1970).
98. '24 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970).
99. Berger, supra note 92, at 338-50.
100. See §§ 290.400-.461, RSMo 1969.
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Administration was given to the Industrial Commission, which was em-
powered to carry out an educational programl ° 1 concerning the problems
of female employment and to mediate' 02 any dispute concerning pay
discrimination. However, the Commission has never been appropriated
sufficient funds to perform its mandate.103 The Missouri act also provides
that a female receiving less wages than she is entitled to may maintain
an action in circuit court for recovery.'0 4 The limitations on these actions,
however, render them worthless. Suit must be instituted within 6 months
of the alleged violation, and liability cannot extend prior to 80 days
before receipt of written notice of the claim filed by the employee.'0 5
IV. RiEMEDIES: DISCRIMINATORY PRAarIcEs LEGISLATION
A. Federal-Civil Rights Act and the E.E.O.C.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 declares it an unlawful
employment practice for any employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, condition, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in a way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. 108
Similar provisions pertain to labor unions and employment agencies. 107
There are conflicting stories concerning the source of the "sex" pro-
vision in this Act.' 08 Representative Howard Smith, who eventually voted
against the entire bill, introduced the amendment adding the word "sex."
Some asserted this was a joke, or a move by Representative Smith designed
to help defeat the legislation. Representative Smith denied this. Members
of the National Women's Party point out that they had vigorously lobbied
for such an inclusion and that Representative Smith mentioned them when
he first stated he would offer an amendment. The lack of debate in regard
to the sex provision is explained by the fact that full hearings and debate
on the issue of sex discrimination had taken place only the year before
when the Equal Pay Act was before Congress. 09 Whatever its source, the
101. Id. § 290A60.
102. Id. § 290.430.
103. Letter from James J. Butler, Chairman, Industrial Commission of Mis-
souri, to the author, March 30, 1972.
104. § 290.440, RSMo 1969.
105. Id. § 290.450.
106. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1970).
107. Id., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 (b) (c).
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provision barring discrimination on the basis of sex in any form affecting
employment is in the Act, and the courts are giving it the same potency
they have given the racial provisions.
The coverage of Title VII is obviously much broader than that of the
Equal Pay Act, since it forbids all types of discrimination, and applies to
administrative or executive positions as well as to non-administrative em-
ployees.110 It originally extended to all employers who had 25 or more
employees."' The Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act of
1972 extended this to employers of 15 or more persons.'1 2 Title VII did
not include within its jurisdiction educational institutions or federal and
state agencies, with the exception of employment agencies." 38 The 1972
legislation brings these entities within the discrimination ban of the Act.11'
The enforcement provisions of the Act have not been as strong as
those for the Equal Pay Act, and have been the source of much controversy.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.) is charged
with administration of Title VII, but in addition to educational functions,
it was originally given power only to conciliate disputes."15 The Attorney
General was empowered by the 1964 Act to bring court action to enjoin
discriminatory "[p]ractices and [p]atterns";'l 6 however, by October, 1971
only two actions on sex discrimination had, in fact, been instituted.11
Primary enforcement was left in the hands of individuals, who can seek
injunctions, damages, attorney's fees and costs."' s
Political controversy concerning enforcement powers of the E.E.O.C.
has been heated. The E.E.O.C. desired self-enforcing cease and desist power
or, at least, power to initiate court action itself to obtain injunctions and
damages. Since it is charged with ending not only sex discrimination but
also racial discrimination, and its power extends over most employers in the
country, there are many groups who opposed this grant of power."19 The
possibility of a further clog on the already heavily burdened federal courts
also influenced some to oppose a grant of this type of power to the
E.E.O.C.120 The latest in the rounds of legislative maneuvers to change
Title VII was House Resolution 1746, which passed the House of Repre-
sentatives on September 16, 1971.121 Entitled the Equal Employment
Opportunities Enforcement Act of 1972, it was radically amended-to in-
110. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (f) (1970).
111. Id., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b).
112. Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act of 1972 § 2 (2), 3 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 814 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Enforcement Act].
113. Civil Rights' Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (a), 2000 e-l (1970).
114. Enforcement Act §§ 2, 3.
115. Civil Rights' Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (a) (e) (1970).
116. Id., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (a) (1970).
117. Hearings on S. 2515 and H.R. 1746 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1971).
118. Civil Rights' Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (e) (1970).
119. See Hearings on S. 2515 and H.R. 1746, supra note 117, at 471-99.
120. Letter from Senator Thomas F. Eagleton to the author, Dec. 17, 1971.
121. 112 CONG. REc. 8539 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1971).
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clude many of the provisions of Senate Resolution 2515. It passed the
Senate on February 22, 1972, after a five week long filibuster. 2 2 On March
8, the amended version was approved by the House of Representatives. 23
The measure gives the E.E.O.C. power to initiate actions in federal court
seeking injunctions and damages for discriminatory action. 12 4 This legis-
lation also extends the Commission's jurisdiction to state and local
governments and educational institutions. 25 However, in regard to state
and local government agencies, the E.E.O.C. cannot bring court action;
only the Attorney General is authorized to do so. 126 If the case is alleged
to be "in the general public interest," the Commission may ask for a
special three judge panel with direct appeal to the Supreme Court.127
Significantly, the private aggrieved party is given a cause of action against
educational institutions and governmental units if neither the E.E.O.C. nor
the Attorney General brings suit.128 This may be the most important
aspect of the inclusion of these units under Title VII, because no com-
parable private power had existed.
The 1972 Act has given the E.E.O.C. significant power, but, even with
substantial increases in staff and operating funds, there will still be a
need for private lawsuits under the Act. The number of complaints filed
with the Commission is large and is increasing phenomenally. 2 9 In the
area of sex discrimination the increasingly active women's organizations
probably account for a large percentage of the increase. Of the total of
75,000 charges that had been filed by the middle of 1971, 16,000 were
claims of sex discrimination. 13 0 During the entire year of 1970, 8500 sex
discrimination complaints were made; in the first six months of 1971,
3300 were filed.131 Inclusion of governmental agencies and educational
institutions within the jurisdiction should lead to an astronomical leap
in these numbers. Therefore, the private lawsuit against private, govern-
mental and educational employers can be a vital remedy. 32
122. 118 CONG. REc. 2306 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1972); 3 U.S. CODE CONG. &c An.
NEws 814 (1972). See N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
123. CONG. Rzc. 118 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1972); 3 U.S. CODE CONG. &c AD.
NEws 814 (1972).
124. Enforcement Act § 4. The filibuster was broken after this form of
enforcement was agreed upon rather than cease and desist power, which hadpreviously been in the bill at the behest of labor, civil rights, and women's rights
groups. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1972, at 1, col. 1.125. Enforcement Act §§ 2, 3. Enforcement of the discrimination ban in most
federal agencies is placed in the Civil Service Commission. Id. § 11.
126. Id. § 4.
127. Id.
128. Id. Private civil action against heads of federal agencies is authorized by
section 11 of the Enforcement Act.
129. Hearings on S. 2515 and H.R. 1746, supra note 117, at 53, 65-72.
130. Fuentes, Federal Remedial Sanctions: Focus on Title VII, 5 VAL.. L. REv.
374, 379 (1971).
131. Id.
132. The role of the private attorney is discussed in Pressman, Sex Discrimina-
tion in Employment and What You Can Do About It, 54 WoMFN L.J. No. 4, 6(1968). That fees can be substantial is illustrated by an award of $11,000 to one
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B. The Missouri Fair Employment Practices Act and the M.I.R.C.
In Missouri the Fair Employment Practices Act, which was amended
in 1965 to include sex discrimination, prohibits discrimination in employ-
ment in terms similar to those of the federal legislation.133 Administrative
enforcement is placed in the Missouri Human Rights Commission
(M.H.R.C.), which was originally given much more extensive powers than
the federal E.E.O.C.13 4 The M.H.R.C. has the power to hold its own hear-
ings and to issue cease and desist orders.' 35 Although court action to enforce
a cease and desist order is seldom resorted to, the Commission's Director
feels that the power to do so is a valuable weapon in achieving voluntary
conciliation with employers who have discriminated. 3 6 An additional ad-
vantage of the Missouri legislation is that it applies to employers of 6 or
more persons;' 37 the only remedies available to those working for a person
who employs more than 6 and less than 15 persons are under the Missouri
law. Prior to the recent changes in the federal legislation, the Missouri law
also provided the only remedies for discrimination by the state or its
political subdivisions.' 38
The M.H.R.C., like the E.E.O.C., is burdened by a caseload that is too
extensive for its staff and funding to handle as expeditiously as would be
desired.130 Although the number of cases received in 1971 was 40% over
the previous year, the Commission closed more cases in 1971 than it re-
ceived.140 Nevertheless, it began 1972 with a backlog of 800 cases.' 4 1 Much
of the recent increase in cases has been due to sex discrimination complaints.
They rose from 67 in 1970 to 169 in 1972, which represents 17% of the
of plaintiffs' attorneys in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir.
1969). Missouri attorneys are likely to receive cooperation and help from the
Regional Office of the E.E.O.C. Letter from Regional Attorney Sandra Neese to
the author, Nov. 29, 1971.
133. See Ch. 296, RSMo 1969.
134. The Attorney General has ruled that the omission of the word "sex"
from section 296.030, RSMo 1969, which delineates the powers of the Missouri
Commission on Human Rights, was a legislative oversight, and that the scope
and breadth of section 296.040, RSMo 1969, confers jurisdiction upon the Com-
mission to receive, conciliate, and prosecute complaints of sex discrimination. 28
Mo. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. 298 (Nov. 24, 1971).
135. § 296.040, RSMo 1969.
136. Hurst, FEPA Prohibits Unfair Employment Practices, Columbia Mis-
sourian, Mar. 22, 1972, at 18, col. 1.
137. § 296.010 (2), RSMo 1971 Supp.
138. However, some entities are questioning the power of M.H.R.C. over
them. The City of St. Louis has moved for dismissal of a subpoena issued by the
M.H.R.C. for production of copies of hiring and promotion tests used by the St.
Louis Fire Department. The city claims its charter provides exclusive processes
for hiring practices. PROGRESS, Feb., 1972, at I (the M.H.R.C. Newsletter). The
Board of Curators of the University of Missouri also challenges the jurisdiction of
the M.H.R.C. Hurst, supra note 136.
139. Letters to the author from Executive Director Clyde L. Scott, March 27,
1972, and Chairman Richard J. Chamier, March 27, 1972.
140. Scott letter, supra note 139.
141. Id.; PROGRESS, supra note 138.
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complaints filed. 142 Of the 123 complaints filed through February, 1972,
32% were sex discrimination matters.1 43 The pattern of increasing charges
of sex discrimination experienced by the E.E.O.C. has been repeated here.
The M.H.R.C. treats these charges no differently than those alleging dis-
crimination on other grounds, and investigates all charges filed directly
with it.14 4 Approximately 40% of the charges filed are deferred to the
M.H.R.C. by the E.E.O.C. where they were originally filed; these are
screened, and jurisdiction is waived in many of those involving employers
with enough employees to give the E.E.O.C. jurisdiction.145 When jurisdic-
tion is so waived, the E.E.O.C. proceeds exclusively. 140 Therefore, the person
who wants to insure that the M.H.R.C. will investigate his charge should
file his complaint directly with the M.H.R.C. and not with the E.E.O.C.
C. Private Action Under the Civil Rights Act
Pursuit of a private remedy (rather than relying solely on the adminis-
trative process) will apparently have to be under the federal legislation. The
Missouri Act does not provide for action other than by the Human Rights
Commission. Enforcement by private suit is complicated by the fact that
Title VII requires that the state agency be given 60 days within which to act
before jurisdiction may be asserted by the E.E.O.C. 147 The practice that has
developed is that if the aggrieved person files his claim with the E.E.O.C.
first, it notifies the Human Rights Commission. At the end of 60 days, if
the controversy has not been settled, the E.E.O.C. treats the claim as filed
with it at that time, and proceeds with its own investigation. In January,
1972 the Supreme Court held that this procedure met the requirements of
the Act.' 48 As a practical matter, the Missouri Human Rights Commission
may expedite this process by waiving jurisdiction relatively quickly.' 40 The
E.E.O.C. treats the claim as having been filed as of the time notice of waiver
or dismissal is received. 8 0 An additional complexity in the federal act is
the time limitations. If no charge is filed with a state agency, it must be
filed with the E.E.O.C. within 180 days after the alleged discrimination. 1
142. Scheer, We Comment On-Equal Rights for Women, PROGREss, Nov.
1971, at 3 (the M.H.R.C. Newsletter).
143. Scott letter, supra note 139.
144. Chamier letter, supra note 139.
145. Letter from Sandra Neese, Regional Attorney, E.E.O.C. to the author,
Nov. 29, 1971; Scott letter, supra note 139.
146. The Executive Director states:
This procedure has the effect of reducing duplication in our investigative
efforts, and stabilizes or reduces our case backlog which permits us to give
quicker service on complaints. (Note: If we had sufficient staff we would
be investigating all of these EEOC deferred complaints as well as those
filed directly to MCHR.)
Scott letter, supra note 139.
147. Civil Rights' Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-5 (c) (1970).
148. Love v. Pullman Co., 92 S. Ct. 616 (1972).
149. Neese letter, supra note 145; Scott letter, supra note 189.
150. Letter from Eugene P. Kennan, District Director E.E.O.C., St. Louis, to
Clyde Scott, Executive Director M.H.R.C., March 9, 1972.
151. Enforcement Act § 4.
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When a charge has been filed initially with a state agency the charge must
be filed with the E.E.O.C. within 300 days of the discriminatory act, or
within 30 days of notice of termination of the state proceedings, whichever
is earlier.' 52 It is to be expected that the E.E.O.C. office which has received
the original charge and has filed it for the aggrieved person with the state
agency, will automatically assume jurisdiction upon the 299th day after
the act if no termination of the state proceeding has been effected. 153
The 1972 Enforcement Act provides that an individual may pursue his
private remedy if the E.E.O.C. has dismissed his charge or if 150 days have
elapsed since filing the charge with the E.E.O.C. and no conciliation agree-
ment has been reached and no court action has been filed by the E.E.O.C.
or the Attorney General. 5 4 Notification is to be sent to the aggrieved party
and he has 90 days after notice to initiate court action. 155
In eastern Missouri, there had been a vital jurisdictional prerequisite
imposed by the federal court for the eastern district. It would not entertain
a private action unless there had been a finding by the E.E.O.C. of probable
cause to believe discrimination had occurred.155 In other words, if the
E.E.O.C. dismissed a matter there was no recourse in court. Other courts,
including the federal court for the western district, held that a probable
cause finding was not jurisdictional. 5 7 The 1972 amendment clarifies that
a probable cause finding is not a prerequisite to jurisdiction.' 5 8
D. Substantive Interpretations Under the Civil Rights Act
Although Title VII is relatively new, enough court decisions on sub-
stantive issues have been resolved to indicate that the course of court in-
terpretation is going to be in favor of liberal construction of the statute, in
order to achieve the goal of equal treatment of men and women with re-
gard to employment. That the law provides blanket coverage of all aspects
related to employment is apparent from a recent decision which the Su-
preme Court refused to review. In Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc.,5 9 re-
tirement plan provisions negotiated through collective bargaining which
required women to retire and collect pension benefits at age 62 but which
allowed men to work until age 65 were held to infringe upon a woman's
equal right to work.
Uncertainty as to whether the Civil Rights Act supersedes state pro-
tective legislation which limits the hours women can work, the weight
152. Id. The "whichever is earlier" language in the Civil Rights' Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (e) (1970), had been interpreted to mean exactly what it said.
Payne v. Ford Motor Co., 334 F. Supp. 172, 175 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
153. This is the procedure that was followed before the 1972 amendment, when
the time limit was 210 days. Keenan letter, supra note 150.
154. Enforcement Act § 4.
155. Id.
156. See Payne v. Ford Motor Co., 334 F. Supp. 172 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
157. Shannon v. Western Elec. Co., 315 F. Supp. 1374 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
158. Enforcement Act § 4.
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they can be required to lift, or the time they can be employed before or
after childbirth has given way to the conclusion that it does supersede
such legislation. Since it is doubtful that this kind of legislation would be
declared unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection,60  it has
been extremely significant that Title VII has achieved the same result
through the doctrine of supremacy of federal legislation. During the
transition period in which interpretations were developing,161 employers
were justifiably frustrated. On the one hand, they were told that if they
violated the state legislation by allowing a woman to lift weights in excess
of the statutory limits they would be subject to state criminal prosecution;
on the other hand, if they did not permit a woman to hold a job in which
she had to lift such weights they would be subject to damages under Title
VII. The E.E.O.C. finally took the position that an employer could not
refuse to employ a woman for a job she could perform without violating
the federal legislation and, therefore, to the extent that state legislation
conflicted, it was not enforceable. 16 2 Either through state legislation, court
action, or attorney general's rulings, by 1972, most states had effectively
eliminated protective legislation pertaining only to men or only to
women.163 The Attorney General of Missouri has ruled that Missouri's
legislation limiting the hours women may work is superseded by the federal
statute. 64 This writer would expect the following also to be superseded:
restrictions against women working around mines' 6 5 or near moving ma-
chinery 66 and against cleaning mill machinery; 6 7 and limits on the time
before and after childbirth that women may work.' 0 8 Since the supremacy
of the federal laws would only apply in regard to employers of 15 or more
persons, state legislation or the Equal Rights Amendment will be needed
to invalidate protective requirements in smaller operations. 1609
One of the more interesting substantive issues under Title VII arises
from the clause in the Act which permits hiring members of only one sex
"in those certain instances where ... sex ... is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation"'1 0 of a par-
160. See text accompanying notes 60-64 supra.
161. Comment, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1187 (1971). For an example of an employer
caught between federal and state legislation, see Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills,
800 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969).
162. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (2) (1970).
163. See CCH EMPL. PRAC. 20.095 (1972) (chart of Female Protective Laws).
164. 28 Mo. Ar'v GEN. Op. No. 231 (Nov. 11, 1971).
165. § 293.060, RSMo 1969.
166. Id. § 292.040.
167. Id.
168. Id. § 290.060.
169. Section 290.020 (8), RSMo 1969 specifically states that it shall not be an
unlawful practice under the Missouri Fair Employment Practice Law to differen-
tiate between male and female if such differences are otherwise required or per-
mitted by law. It appears that Missouri's "protective" legislation is viable in re-
gard to employers of less than 15 persons.
170. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (e) (1) (1970).
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ticular business. Words that ambiguous are a lawyer's delightl If sex is a
bona fide occupational qualification for a job, employers could close the
job to all members of the other sex to the extent of not even entertaining
applications. The E.E.O.C. took the position quite early that sex as a
BFOQ would rarely be found.171 In Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Co.,172 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted es-
sentially the Commission's position and held that the employer has the
burden of establishing that he had a factual basis for believing that all or
substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently
the requirements of the job. Later decisions tended to follow this ap-
proach.'7 3 In one case in which the employer had asserted that weight
lifting requirements might be more than women could handle, the court
suggested that a job study should be carried out to analyze these require-
ments after which individual applicants could be given an opportunity to
demonstrate their capacity to perform the requirements. 7 4 The capstone
of the BFOQ controversy came on November 9, 1971, when the Supreme
Court refused to review the decision in Diaz v. Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc.'75 Although the feminists may be disgruntled that such an im-
portant decision came in a case in which the plaintiff was a man, the sub-
stance is crucial for guaranteeing an opportunity to obtain employment
without regard to sex. Pan American had refused to entertain applications
from men for the position of flight cabin attendant (commonly known as
stewardess). At the trial, Dr. Eric Berne'76 testified for Pan Am that women
were superior to men in fulfilling the psychological needs of passengers
The trial court held that sex (female) was a BFOQ for the position of
flight cabin attendant. The court found: women were superior in the
non-mechanical functions of the job; passengers overwhelmingly preferred
women as attendants; sex qualification was the best available tool to screen
out applicants likely to be unsatisfactory; and that without this selection
criteria the average performance of Pan Am would be lessened. The circuit
court held, on the basis of the trial court's fact finding, that female sex
was not a BFOQ for the position. Three of the court's considerations are of
particular interest. First, the court made the determination that the busi-
ness necessity requirement for the exception should be interpreted under
a necessity, rather than a convenience test. It stated that sex discrimination
was valid only if the essence of the business would be undermined by the
hiring of members of both sexes; since the essence of the business of Pan
171. 30 Fed. Reg. 14,927 (1965), as amended, 34 Fed. Reg. 13,368 (1969); 37
Fed. Reg. 6835 (1972).
172. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
173. See Cheatwood v. South Cent. Bell Tel. &c Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754
(M.D. Ala. 1969); Comment, supra note 161, at 1179.
174. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
175. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Nov. 9,
1971).
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Am was safe transportation, it would not be undermined by hiring male
flight cabin attendants. Second, the court referred to the Weeks rule that
all or substantially all of one sex must be shown to be unable to perform
a job necessary to the normal operation of the business and stated crypti-
cally that here not "all men" were so shown. Third, the court approved the
Commission's guidelines' 77 which discount entirely, as an irrelevant factor,
the preference of customers for members of one sex. The court said: "[I]t
was, to a large extent, these very prejudices the Act was meant to over-
come."1 78 The court indicated that customer preference was to be taken
into account only when it was based on the inability of members of the
non-preferred sex to perform the primary function of the business. Although
more litigation may be expected on the meaning and application of BFOQ,
it is evident that the Commission's guidelines are going to be accepted by
the courts and they will rarely accept sex as a BFOQ.
The guidelines now indicate that the Commission will consider sex
as a BFOQ only for reasons of genuineness or authenticity (e.g., an
actor).179 The argument that women are more expensive to hire due to
maternity leaves, absenteeism or high job turnover will not be accepted
by the E.E.O.C. as a reason for making male sex a BFOQ for any job. The
Commission's guidelines state that the following situations do not warrant
application of the BFOQ exception:
(i) The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex, based
on assumptions of the comparative employment characteristics of
women in general. For example, the assumption that the turnover
rate among women is higher than among men.
(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped
characterizations of the sexes .... The principle of non-discrimi-
nation requires that individuals be considered on the basis of in-
dividual capacities and not on the basis of any characteristics
generally attributed to the group. 80
The decision in Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp.,'8s which is the first
Supreme Court opinion on the BFOQ issue, augurs well for the E.E.O.C.
position. The case involved a rule against hiring women with pre-school
children. The Court stated that the Civil Rights Act required that persons
of like qualifications be given equal employment opportunities regardless
of sex and vacated a summary judgment which had approved the rule.18 2
How to treat pregnancy and childbirth is a problem area in itself.
177. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (1971), as revised, 37 Fed. Reg. 6835 (1972).
178. 442 F.2d at 389.
179. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (1971), as revised, 37 Fed. Reg. 6835 (1972).
180. Id. See generally Comment, supra note 161, at 1181-86.
181. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
182. It should be noted, however, that the Court did use language which
Justice Marshall found dangerous in that it indicated a belief that such a hiring
policy could be justified by showing that, in general, a woman's responsibility for
small children interferred with job performance. Id. at 544 (concurring opinion).
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Both the Office of Federal Contract Compliance'83 and the E.E.O.C. have
ruled that pregnancy and childbirth must be treated akin to other tempo-
rary physical disabilities:18 4 employment of a pregnant woman may not
be terminated at the behest of the employer; 8 5 maternity leave for a rea-
sonable time with reinstatement to a job with equal status, pay and seniority
must be granted, if otherwise, a disparate effect on employees of one sex
results;' s8 and medical or disability insurance must be available on equal
terms with other disabilities.' 8 7 In short, the possibility of childbirth can-
not justify male sex as a BFOQ for a job. Little court litigation has occurred
but one would expect the usual deference to administrative formulation of
policy.'8 8
In summary, Title VII theoretically ends sex discrimination in em-
ployment. Its prohibitions are all-inclusive; the Commission and the courts
are interpreting them liberally to end discriminatory practices, and at-
torneys who are successful may collect fees from the hapless defendant. The
real challenge lies where it usually is in legal conflicts-in the facts. Those
expecting an early end to what they visualize as discrimination must be
reminded that these rights can be protected only when suspicions or beliefs
of discrimination can be translated into proof of discrimination.
V. REMEDIES: EXEcUTIvE ORDERS
As part of the compromise necessary to obtain passage of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, Title VII exempted governmental agencies. However, the
Act itself suggested that the President, by executive order, deal with dis-
crimination in federal employment.18 9 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
183. 41 C.F.R. § 60 -20.3 (g) (1971). For a discussion of the general functions
of the O.F.C.C., see the text accompanying notes 190-98 infra.
184. 37 Fed. Reg. 6837 (1972). Although the E.E.O.C. did not issue guidelines
until April, 1972, it had established this principle in case-by-case decisions. See
Fuentes, Federal Remedial Sanctions: Focus on Title VII, 5 VALP L. REV. 374,
390 (1971); Koontz, Childbirth and Childbearing Leave: Job Related Benefits,
17 N.Y.L.F. 480, 487-490 (1971); CCH EMPL. PiMC. 1310, at 1187-89 (1972).
185. E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 70-360, 37 Fed. Reg. 6837 (1972).
186. 37 Fed. Reg. 6837 (1972); Fuentes, supra note 184, at 391.
187. E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 71-1474, 37 Fed. Reg. 6837 (1972).
188. In Schattman v. Texas Empl. Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), the
circuit court reversed a finding that a policy of terminating employment two
months prior to expected delivery time violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on
the ground that the employer was excluded from jurisdiction as a state agency.
The court went on to hold no violation of equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment because evidence established the reasonable basis required by Reed
v. Reed, 92 S. Ct. 251 (1972). Physicians had testified that women were less ef-
ficient and subject to physical limitations during the last two months of pregnancy.
If jurisdiction of the Civil Rights Act had existed, this generalized evidence prob-
ably would not have been sufficient. The interpretations of the Act discussed in
the text are that only evidence of a particular person's inefficiency and limitations
due to pregnancy would justify terminating her employment. See Koontz, supra
note 184.
189. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701 (h), 78 Stat. 254.
This proviso was eliminated from 42 U.S.C. 2000 in the 1966 Codification of Gov-
ernment Organizations and Employees, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 8, 89 Stat. 632. It is
now 5 U.S.C. § 7151 (1970).
[-Vol 37
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of 1964 forbade discrimination on the basis of race, color or national
origin in any activity receiving federal funds, and authorized the federal
departments (with the President's permission) to secure compliance.190
President Johnson responded with Executive Order No. 11,246101 for-
bidding discrimination on account of race, color, religion, or national origin
in any aspect of federal employment and in employment by contractors
with the federal government. In 1967 this order was amended to forbid
discrimination on account of sex. 19 2 This amended order not only en-
compasses local and state governmental units and educational institutions,
but also includes many private employers who were already subject to the
jurisdiction of E.E.O.C. under Title VII. It is estimated that the Order
covers one-third of all jobs in the United States1 93 even though it has been
limited by rule to employers of 25 or more receiving over $10,000 in federal
funds annually.194
Administration of the portion of the Order covering federal em-
ployees is vested in the Civil Service Commission, 195 and of that covering
employees of contractors in the Department of Labor. 9 6 The latter duties
are entrusted to the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (O.F.C.C.). 197
However, each federal department actually dispensing money to contractors
is given primary responsibility for obtaining adherence to the Order and
the rules and regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor to
effectuate it.198
Enforcement of the Order is cumbersome: withholding funds under
current contracts or declarations that a contractor is ineligible for future
funds.1 99 There is apparently no method whereby an individual may
pursue a cause of action for damage to himself for violation of executive
order by a private contractor.200 In theory, withholding of funds could be
190. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000d-1 (1970).
191. 3 C.F.R. 167 (Supp. 1965), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3
C.F.R. 320 (Supp. 1967) and Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 133 (Supp. 1969).
[Hereinafter cited as the order].
192. Exec. Order No. 11,375, 8 C.F.R. 820 (Supp. 1967).
193. Hearings on S. 2515 and H.R. 1746 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1971).
194. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5 (a) (1971).
195. Exec. Order No. 11,478 § 3, 3 C.F.R. 133 (Supp. 1969). The Enforcement
Act of 1972 also forbids discrimination in governmental departments (including
the military departments), with enforcement vested in the Civil Service Commis-
sion rather than in the E.E.O.C. Enforcement Act § 11.
196. The Order, part 11 A, § 201.
197. Order of Sec. of Labor, 30 Fed. Reg. 13,441 (1965).
198. The Order, part II C, § 205.
199. Id. part 11 D, § 209 (a).
200. Cf. Hadnott v. Laird, .2d . (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discusses ad-
ministrative review).
A private remedy may exist under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See text ac-
companying notes 147-88 supra. Such a remedy has existed against federal agencies
since March, 1972. Enforcement Act § 11. Further, a cause of action has been rec-
ognized under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (2) (1970), for back pay against
a federal agency which violated the Order by refusing to employ a black woman
1972]
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done because of individual instances of discrimination within the con-
tractor's entity. One would hardly expect cancellation of a contract or dis-
barment for eligibility for future contracts on the basis of isolated instances
of discrimination. The impracticability of enforcement on the basis of
individual instances is such that emphasis has been placed instead on
"affirmative action," which the Executive Order specifically requires of
contractors to insure that applicants are employed without regard to dis-
crimination. 20 ' Speaking in opposition to a proposal to transfer the func-
tions of the O.F.C.C. to the E.E.O.C., Undersecretary of Labor Silberman
said:
The two programs of EEOC and OFCC are substantially dif-
ferent .... The Commission undertakes to investigate complaints
alleging job-related discrimination, and where the complaint ap-
pears meritorious, seeks to obtain a voluntary resolution.
The contract compliance program['s] ... focus is not on indi-
vidual instances of discrimination, as is the function of EEOC, but
on broader employment patterns and systems. Its purpose is to as-
sure that contractors take affirmative action to provide equal em-
ployment opportunity. 202
The final version of the Equal Employment Opportunities Enforce-
ment Act of 1972 did not transfer these functions but established mechan-
isms for cooperation among E.E.O.C., O.F.C.C. and other federal
entities.20 3 The intent to foster the pattern described by Silberman is clear.
All federal contractors are forbidden to discriminate and all are sub-
jected to the requirement of affirmative action.204 In January, 1970, Order
No. 4 of the Secretary of Labor set out guidelines for developing affirma-
tive action programs for all non-construction contractors obtaining $50,000
or more annually in federal funds and employing 50 or more persons. 205
The order was significant, as the first which detailed required contents
and methods for implementing them. The order did not include specifica-
tions for programs designed to halt sex discrimination. In June, 1970,
guidelines pertaining to specific instances of sex discrimination (but not
to affirmative action programs) were first published. 206 It was not until
because of her race. Chambers v. United States, 451 F.2d 1045 (Ct. Cl. 1971). Cf.
Harris v. Nixon, 325 F. Supp. 28 (D. Colo. 1971) (reviewing administrative ac-
tion).
201. The Order, pt. II, § 202 (l) states: "The contractor will take affirmative
action to ensure that applicants are employed and that employees are treated dur-
ing employment without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin."
202. Hearings on S. 2515 and H.R. 1746, supra note 193, at 80-81.
203. Section 10 of the Enforcement Act establishes an Equal Employment Op-
portunity Coordinating Council composed of the Secretary of Labor, the Chair-
man of the E.E.O.C., the Attorney General and the Chairman of the United States
Civil Rights Commission. The Council is charged with responsibility for coordinat-
ing all of the equal employment opportunity efforts of the federal government.
204. See generally 41 C.F.R. ch. 60 (1971).
205. Id. §§ 60-2.1 to .32 (1971); CCH Empl. Prac. 1624. at 1468 (1972).
206. See 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-20 (1971), and 35 Fed. Reg. 8888 (1970). These guide-
lines are much like those of the E.E.O.C. under the Civil Rights Act in that they
[Vol. 37
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December 4, 1971, that Order No. 4 was revised to require detailed af-
firmative action programs for the elimination of discrimination against
women.20 7 Labor Secretary J. D. Hodgson stated that experience under
Order No. 4 made the Department increasingly aware of problems of equal
employment opportunities for women, and that this led to the formulation
of the revised order.208 Organized women's groups had inundated HEW's
Office of Civil Rights during 1970-71 with complaints of discrimination in
higher education. The Women's Equity Action League, alone, filed charges
at about 260 campuses between January, 1970 and October, 1971.200 At-
torneys for WEAL have been dissatisfied with the response of HEW in
investigating and obtaining compliance. 210 It is true that HEW negotiated
for a long time with various universities such as Columbia University and
the University of Michigan in regard to affirmative action programs prior
to the requirement that sex be included in such plans.211 However, the
inclusion of sex discrimination in affirmative action may well provide the
means for achieving the goal of the Executive Order to end sex discrimi-
nation.
There is good reason to believe that the years of experience of the
O.F.C.C. is just now beginning to bear fruit in terms of success in contract
compliance. For a long while employers did not know what was expected
of them in developing affirmative action programs. Consequently, ignor-
ance itself played a hand in slowing compliance efforts. Speaking in the
fall of 1971, Secretary Silberman emphatically stated:
Even the most vigorous policy, however, cannot be successful unless
those who are subject to it have a clear idea of what is specifically
required. It has only been within the last 2 years that these stand-
ards have been adequately spelled out, and it is this new element
which has revolutionized the contract compliance program.2 12
Affirmative action in regard to discrimination against women under
Revised Order No. 4 requires employers to analyze their work force to
determine whether women are being underutilized and, if so, to develop
goals and timetables for remedying the deficiency.2 13 Underutilization is
require no differentiation on the basis of sex in employment. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (1970). In addition, a female must be granted a leave of absence for
childbearing and, upon return in a reasonable time, must be reinstated to her
original job or one of equal status without loss of service credits. 41 C.F.R. § 60-
20.2 (g).
207. 86 Fed. Reg. 21,152 (1971); see CCH EMPL. PPAc. 4320, at 2159-68
(1972).
208. HIGHER EDUCATION & NAT'L AFFAIRS, Dec. 3, 1971, at 2 (Newsletter).
209. Shapley, University Women's Right: Whose Feet Are Dragging? 175
SCIENCE 151 (1972). Apparently, W.E.A.L. has chosen academia as the place in
which to first attack sex discrimination on a large scale. What happens there may
set the pattern for all employment areas.
210. Id. at 153.
211. Id. at 152-53.
212. Hearings on S. 2515 and H.R. 1746, supra note 198, at 77.
213. 36 Fed. Reg. 21,152 (1971).
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defined as having fewer women in a particular job classification than would
reasonably be expected by their availability.2 14 The factors to be con-
sidered by contractors and subcontractors in analyzing their work forces
include: number of unemployed women, percentage of women in the work
force, availability of women having requisite skills and availability of
women seeking employment in the labor area surrounding the facility;
availability of women having requisite skills which the contractor could
reasonably recruit; availability of promotable and transferable women in
the contractor's organization; anticipated changes in the contractor's work
force; availability of institutions capable of training persons in the requisite
skills; and training that the contractor could reasonably undertake to make
all job classes available to women.215 Once underutilization is determined,
the contractor must develop reasonably attainable goals for correcting his
deficiencies within a reasonable time, assuming that he puts forth every
good faith effort to make his affirmative action program work.2 10
A second fact which had slowed progress in implementing the Execu-
tive Order was that employers did not know what information needed to
be collected and delivered to the government. The long time that nego-
tiations with Columbia University have taken is charged to the difficulty
of collecting data from the University needed to determine whether or not
a pattern of discrimination exists. President McGill of Columbia is re-
ported to have stated to the Columbia University Senate that Columbia
did not discriminate but that, "It is exceedingly difficult to prove what
we do because it is exceedingly difficult to develop the data base to show,
in the depth and detail demanded, what the university's personnel prac-
tices in fact are." 217 Revised Order No. 4 specifically requires that support
data for the analysis and program shall be compiled and maintained, and
that the data shall include progression line charts, seniority rosters, ap-
plicant flow data and applicant rejection ratios indicating minority and
sex status.2 18 According to Secretary Silberman,
Great progress is being made in increasing the availability of data
concerning the impact of the program . . . .A contractor self-
analysis and evaluation form is being developed and is undergoing
review. This form will standardize the information coming in from
contractors concerning their utilization of minority employees and
women. It will facilitate the use of automatic data processing sys-
tems in aid of the program.219
An example of the type of thing that the O.F.C.C. may require is the
demand for additional information which HEW made on the University
of Michigan in January, 1972. The letter requested:
214. CCH EMPL. PRAC. 4320.11, at 2161 (1972).
215. Id.
216. Id. 4320.12.
217. University Women's Rights, supra note 209, at 153.
218. 36 Fed. Reg. 21,152 (1971).
219. Hearings on S. 2515 and H.R. 1746, supra note 193, at 78.
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-Computer print-outs of current University of Michigan em-
ployees listed by- job classification and by departmental unit,
including name, race, sex, highest degree earned or level of educa-
-tion, past job history, current job information, and data and
method of entry into current job classification;
-A .computer print-out for each employee who has partici-
pated in a U-M sponsored training program in the past two years;
-A print-out with detailed information on all employees who
left U-M in the past two years;
-A print-out for each employee who has a spouse employed
in any capacity at the University;
-A detailed list of women who have been upgraded since
the U'M-affirmative action program went into effect;
-A list of all academic and administrative persons hired
since- Oct. 6, 1970;
-A detailed list of all applicants considered for those posi-
tions;
-- A list of-job categories investigated by U-M in its review of
files to achieve salary equity between males and females having
equivalent qualifications, responsibilities and performance in the
same job classification. Also, a list of those women whose files were
selected for analysis and a list by department and job classification
of those women who were granted salary increases as a result of
the analysis. 26
Reports are that the University expects to comply with the request.
Fedele F. Fauri, Vice-President for State Relations and Planning, has
stated: "[T]he information required is extensive, and it is true that much
of it is next to impossible to collect, but we are going ahead with gathering
of the information using all resources available." Much of the information,
University officials have pointed out, will have to be gathered manually,
as some information has not been placed into computer storage.2 21
Collection of data of this type from federal contractors will almost
surely speed the affirmative action efforts. Additionally, a recent willing-
ness to exercise sanctions is likely to impel action. After difficulty with a
number of universities HEW issued its first holds on future federal funds
in the fall of 1971.222 It is reported that this action has spurred other
college administrators to action. 22 3 The University of Missouri's Board of
Curators, in January, 1972, adopted a statement of affirmative action which
includes sex discrimination and which authorizes the president to establish
affirmative procedures.22 4 In February, the University of Kansas announced
220. National Ass'n of Universities _& Land Grant Colleges, Circular Letter
No. 5, at 4 (March 2, 1972).
221. Id.
222. HIGHER EDUCATION 9. NAT'L AFFAiRS, Nov. 5, 1971, at 6 (Newsletter).
223. University -Women's Rights, supra note 209, at 153.
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initiation of a comprehensive program.225 The American Council on Edu-
cation has established a committee, headed by Derek C. Bok, President of
Harvard University, to work with federal officials in setting up guidelines
for HEW offices to follow in negotiating affirmative action programs -with
universities.226
Secretary Silberman testified that in his opinion "the contract com-
pliance program is, at long last, well on the road." 227 If this is true, the
addiion of sex discrimination to the affirmative action requirements in
the fall of 1972 was a most propitious development for women.
CONCLUSION
In 1963 the first President's Commission on the Status of Women
called for "action within the judicial, executive, and legislative branches
of government to the end that full equality of rights may become a
reality."228 The decade following is without question the decade of legally
shattered shibboleths of sexism. No longer do stereotyped concepts or
generalized notions of the abilities or interests of a person based solely on
his or her sex have legal relevance. Even in the constitutional context of
state action, evidential support for such generalizations seems imperative.
In the context of employment, the law now demands that an individual be
judged as an individual. A revolution of culture and law is occurring that
holds the promise of achieving the Commission's call for equality of rights.
225. Circular Letter, supra note 220, at 9.
226. CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Dec. 6, 1971, at 2.
227. Hearings on S. 2515 and H.R. 1746, supra note 193, at 78.
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